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INTRODUCTION
PERSPECTIVES ON THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
AFTER TWENTY YEARS
DAN FENNO HENDERSON*

Twenty years (1947-1967) have passed since the enforcement of
the new Japanese Constitution during the allied occupation and in the
aftermath of World War II. The document called for an immediate
transition from imperial to popular sovereignty, but of course the
history of the world's written constitutions shows all too well that
democratic aspirations on paper do not immediately (or necessarily
ever) evoke effective responses in society. In addition, the postwar
birth of the new Constitution was necessarily a Caesarean operation
attended by an alien midwife which the newborn could probably not
have done without nor easily live down. Many writers' were pessimistic, believing that such origins, in the headquarters of the Supreme
Commander, Allied Powers, (SCAP), and the consequent alien quality of the text, would render the Constitution vulnerable to revision
from conservative Japanese soon after the Peace Treaty (1952).
Thrusts for revision did come from the conservatives after the occupation ended, and indeed they clouded, for a time, the origins of the
extremely important Commission on the Constitution (1957-1964),
which, however, under the leadership of the late Kenz6 Takayanagi,
ultimately produced a balanced report (1964) which will remain an
invaluable source of information for years to come.'
* Director, Asian Law Program, University of Washington. B.A., 1944, Whitman

College; B.A., 1945, Michigan; LL.B., 1949, Harvard; Ph.D., 1955, California
(Berkeley).
'See Quigley, Revising the Japanese Constitution, 38 FoREIGN ArrAms (No. 1)
140 (Oct., 1959); Ward, The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 Am.
POL. SCL REv. 990-91 (1956). For references to the literature of this period, see Williams, Making the Japanese Constitution: A Further Look, Am. POL. SCLREv. 665
(1967). See also T. McNelly, Domestic and International Influences on Constitutional
Revision in Japan 1945-1946 (microfilm thesis, Univ. of Mich., 1952). The SCA-P
version is found in SUMaME COMMANDER, ALLIED POWERS, THE PoLrIcAL REORIENrATION OF JAI'Ax 1945-1948 (2 vols.) (1948); and the most detailed and reliable Japanese study is T. SATO, NIHfONKOKU KEMP6 SEIRITSUSHI (2 vols.) (1962).
'See Maki, The Documents of Japan's Commission on the Constitution, 24 J.
ASIAN STUDiES 475 (1964). The Commission on the Constitution (Kemp6 chosakai)
was appointed by the Kishi Cabinet in 1957 pursuant to Law No. 140 (June 11, 1956).
Headed by the late Kenz5 Takayanagi, it labored for seven years (1957-1964) reviewing all aspects of the operations of the Constitution and popular.as well as expert
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Since the filing of the Commission report with the Ikeda Cabinet
on July 3, 1964, observers 3 have generally agreed that the chances of
amendment in the foreseeable future are rather slim, despite some
strong revisionist views in the Commission report and in some factions
of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. Against this background,
it is gratifying to note, after two decades under the new Constitution,
that the Japanese people are indeed operating a successful democratic
government and also actively seeking to improve it.
The articles in this symposium are concerned with several major
problems encountered en route from the promulgation to present social
realization of the new style of Japanese constitutionalism. We have
taken this opportunity to reflect after twenty years upon the problems
of structure, political milieu, and continuity with the past. To some,
continuity with the Meiji Constitution (1889-1947) might seem farfetched until we remember that it had several characteristics in common with the new Constitution: both followed foreign models (German
and Anglo-American); both were far in advance of the social realities
which they sought to transform; both were thus a product of an elitist
ideal and granted from the top down (by Meiji oligarchs and SCAP/
Japanese drafters); neither was produced by a social upheaval, or
granted in response to popular clamorings for power. Paradoxically,
then, in the sweep of a century, the growth of the living constitution
has been rather continuous, though there has been a rapid rate of
achievement. Emphasis on continuity in this sense is important in
focusing on the underlying contribution of the Japanese people to
living constitutionalism. For it would be easy to see only elitist paternalism and popular passivity in the major historical events and
overlook the almost unique social capacity of the Japanese for collective effort, even to insure individual rights to all in the routines of
social and political life.' This quality has been called "creative followership," but in the more recent political process, it has become a
opinion concerning its major features. The Commission, though initially suspected of
revisionist motives, actually chose a purely investigative posture, and presented the
entire spectrum of views on the Commission in its some 40,000 pages of published
records and reports. The Commission as such made no recommendation, but rather
presented all views to speak for themselves. For discussion of revisionist views concerning the public welfare standard in the Japanese constitutional debate, see L. Beer,
The Doctrine of the Public Welfare and the Freedom of Assembly Under the Constitution of Japan 191 (unpublished thesis, Univ. of Wash., 1966).
'See Fukui, Twenty Years of Revisionism, infra this symposium, at 931, and Ward,
The Commuission on the Constitution and Prospects for Constitutional Changes in
Japan, 24 J. ASIAN STUDIES 401-29 (1965).
'See a detailed treatment of this idea in L. Beer, note 2 supra at 39.
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"creative participation," maximizing popular support of the Constitution, as befits a country whose major resource has always been its
remarkable people. Both Japanese constitutions were, in this perspective, exciting experiments in a gamble for popular self-fulfillment
based on the hope that there would develop enough right consciousness
as leverage so that the people could pull themselves up by their own
constitutional boot straps. To an encouraging degree they have.
Another point of continuity with prewar constitutional law is the
persistence of systematic theories developed in Japan, initially under
the influence of the civil law world, which still, in their developed
Japanese form, permeate legal scholarship today. The clarity of analysis and spectrum of opinion6 inherent in such a legacy have contributed
greatly, along with the new case law, in the search for on-going meaning in developing constitutionalism. Indeed, the postwar blend of
concrete case law and synoptic civil analysis may produce a juristic
method drawn from the best of both worlds. For often, common law
lawyers seem to have their oversized feet irrevocably stuck in a quagmire of discreet cases, while their academic civil law brethren often
conversely lose their heads in a cloud of abstractions. The Japanese
jurist seems to be evolving a useful middle way in recent years.
Whatever continuity there has been, it would be a distortion not to
emphasize the novelty of the 1947 Constitution, derived from its alien
sources. Most basic perhaps of its new features is its justiciable quality. By decisions of the courts of its own creation, the Constitution is
now susceptible of legally authoritative meaning unknown to the
Meiji Constitution. This feature makes it not only a lawyer's constitution for the first time but a people's constitution as well because of the
reciprocal support between justiciable rights in the courts and right
consciousness in the populace. There is not the space nor the need to
discuss here the relationship between popular sovereignty and constitutionalism (limited government), but experience has shown that
popular sovereignty requires a meaningful choice at the ballot box and
that a meaningful choice requires freedom of expression, association
and assembly for individuals, best insured and enforced by courts

T. KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN NO H6ISHImI (1967).
'See, for example, the variety of suggestions made by scholars at the Commission

on the Constitution for revision of the judicial provisions. The support for most of
these amendments was light, but the diversity was useful. KEMP6 CHOSAKAI, KOKUTMIN
NO KENRI 0YOBI GIMU; SHIH NI KANSURU HOKOKUSHO 81 (1964).
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empowered to determine the constitutionality of legislation and other
official acts.7
Under the Meiji Constitution, legal challenges of unconstitutionality could not be filed with the regular courts, and therefore such
arguments were only useful to politicians for political effect in trying
to re-align power factions within the Emperor's ruling oligarchy. Thus,
prewar constitutional law was largely a discussion of political theories
by scholars using constitutional language to fortify their conceptions
of the imperial state.' In the literature, academicians were the expounders of the Constitution rather than judges and lawyers.
The transition in 1947 from a political to a legal (or justiciable)
constitution of American design meant, therefore, a reverse shift from
professors to the courts as the authoritative interpreters of the Constitution. Soon followed a body of Supreme Court decisions from which
for the first time lawyers could get detailed and authoritative guides to
answer constitutional questions. This required, in turn, the adoption
throughout the legal profession of a new juristic method in public law
rooted in case analysis. All of these changes-in professional roles,
sources and methods-have caused a new interest among Japanese
lawyers in American constitutional law, and some dilution of prior
preferences for Continental European theories.
The transitions outlined above have not taken place without much
travail and improvisation,9 and this symposium discusses some of these
problems. Of the three major topics, the first is re-appraisal and revisionism. As noted above, one of the chief reasons given for revision of
the Constitution has been its alien origins in the allied occupation, and
the debate has been intensified by the sharply bipolar political alignment since the war. Ironically, the pro-American, conservative and
dominant Liberal Democratic Party has constantly sought revision of
the American-style Constitution, whereas the anti-American socialist
and communist left has staunchly defended the Consitution and has
been able to maintain slightly more than '3 of the seats in the Diet,

7The English constitutional process, insured by purely parliamentary and electoral
safeguards, is an exception to this position; the parliamentary has been effective
enough at home, but it has not survived exportation so well. See D. Henderson, Law
and PoliticalModernization in Japan, in POLITICAL DEVELOP31ENT IN MODERN JAPAN,
387 (R. Ward ed. 1968).
'See F. MILLER, MINOBE TATSUKICHI 43 (1964).

'See H. Itoh, The Japanese Supreme Court:
(unpublished thesis, Univ. of Wash., 1968).
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thus blocking a conservative revision. 0 (See articles herein by Maki,
Takayanagi and Fukui.)
The second topic, the expanded judicial power mentioned above, has
a new importance under the 1947 Constitution. The growth of judicial
power to review legislation is outlined (Henderson) and three specific
problems are treated: political questions (Yokota), judicial review of
administrative actions (Ogawa), and the relation between the Constitution and treaties (Sat6).
The third major topic of the symposium is the eternal balancing, required in all democratic constitutionalism, between individual liberties
and the public welfare. Again, the bipolar extremes in Japanese politics have complicated this problem, especially relating to street meetings and demonstrations (see articles by Beer, Ukai and Nathanson,
and George). The transition from imperial to popular sovereignty,
and the concomitant shift of Japanese constitutionalism from the
realms of political theory to the concreteness of justiciable law have
been achievements of the first order in the past two decades. It should
not escape notice that our Japanese guests in this symposium, led by
former Chief Justice Yokota and especially the late Kenz6 Takayanagi, Chairman of the Commission on the Constitution, have themselves played important roles in the postwar Japanese achievements.

" 0The range of suggested revisions is succinctly set out by the Commission on the
Constitution in KEmP5 CHOSAKAI JIMUKYOKU, KEmP CHOSAKA HOKOKUSHO NO
GAiY6 203-214 (1964).

